My Main Event - Day Four

I had reached the fourth day of a poker tournament just twice before: In 2007 at the EPT in Baden, which was the most important and exciting day of my poker career, and two Februaries ago at the NAPT Venetian where we played down to the final table of eight. Both of those tournaments were deep into the money, whereas in this one, we hadn’t even reached it. 852 players remained with the $19k bubble bursting at 693. As nervous as I was the day before about busting and embarking on a dangerous trip up Mount Rainier, day four was even more nervewracking. After bubbling so many big events in 2010 that I considered naming my book “Life on the Bubble”, it felt like that’s exactly where I was headed once again. The grossest part of it was that I was in exactly the situation I didn’t want to be in heading into day four, beginning the day with an uncomfortable stack of 142k with the blinds at 2000-4000-500.

The second hand of the day I raised AQ under the gun to 9500 and was met by a 3-bet to 25kish from the 850k stack on the button. I had done a little research on this young player, Dan Retallick, who appeared to be an aggressive online player who probably wouldn’t be making any big folds. I ended up folding this hand reluctantly, knowing he could be making a play but not really expecting it two minutes into the day vs a UTG raise.

I have been carefully considering this hand since it went down. Shortly after it happened I was reading Retallick’s twitter and saw that he had nothing that hand, and I was upset at myself for folding. After his 3-bet there is

9 X 500 = 4500 (antes) +

2000 + 4000 = 6000 (blinds) +

9500 (my raise) +

25200 (his reraise) = 45,200 in the pot

If I fold I have 132k, 33 BB, which is fine, but if I shove and he folds I have 177k which sure makes a lot of difference at this point in the tournament. When you factor in his position, his age, his stack, and how often AQ does win against AK, KK, JJ, I convinced myself that folding this hand was a mistake and I should have just taken a risk and piled it.

But then I was reading his twitter a couple days later and realized I misread, that he actually had AK in that hand, and I went back to questioning the whole thing, and really I have no idea what I should have done, though I do think calling the raise is the worst play of the three.

A few hands after that everyone folded to a different kid with a big stack on the button who raised and was called by the older guy in the big blind, who had a ton of chips organized into stacks of ten.

The flop came 744r and the older guy led out. The kid quickly called. The turn was a jack and the older guy checked, then made a 3x raise when the kid bet. Again, he was quickly called. The river was a 9 and the older guy checked again. The kid made a small bet and then, to everyone’s shock, the older guy raised again! The kid quickly called with T4o while the older guy turned over A9o. What a wild hand to see early on Day Four of the Main Event! I think everyone at that moment wondered how in the world that guy had gotten to this point, with a handsome stack to boot.

A few hands later I raised KQo to 9k UTG. When it got to that older guy in late position, he said “raise” and put in 9k, likely never having seen me open the pot. The old guy was forced to make a min-raise to 14k and everyone folded back to me. With 115k in chips I considered shoving but figured he would call spitefully with a lot of weak hands and saw no reason to jeopardize the stack preflop, so I called. The flop came Q74 and I checked it over to the guy, who bet like 18k or something. I tried to look as weak as I could knowing top pair was going to be unfoldable to this guy and then called. The turn was a ten and I checked. The old guy quickly announced all-in, covering me. I called after about fifteen seconds and almost burst out laughing when he turned over the A5 of hearts. Though my tournament could be one card away from coming to a tragic ending, I really found it amusing that this guy had run such a ridiculous all-in bluff with the A5 of hearts on that board just moments after blowing a pile on another comical bluff. No ace on the river and I doubled up to 245k.

The table broke and I was sent to a new table which was filled with young dudes who looked like pros, though I only recognized Justin Zaki a few slots to my left. Most of the players had reship stacks while only Zaki, the young guy to my right, the older guy to his right, and one other Minnesotan across the table had “comfort” stacks as we approached the bubble.

I raised one hand with pocket fours and couldn’t call the BB’s shove.

I raised another hand with pocket sixes from MP and Zaki reraised on the button. Right away I knew three things:

1. His range was extremely wide
2. Four-betting was out of the question since it would be so easy for him to 5-bet shove his covering stack and I certainly wasn’t gonna be calling it off with a pair of sixes at this stage.
3. If I was to flop a set I thought I had a great shot at a double-up. I already had my line planned out: check-call, check-call, check-call. I felt like Zaki would likely keep firing with nothing or a hand he thought was best because of the bubble.

So I called. The flop came A54 and he checked it back, which meant he had something. This hand only would have been interesting if he bet the flop, which would have been more likely to be a bluff.

The turn was a 2 and again it went check-check. I checked the X river to him and he made a bet, which instantly sent my cards into the muck.

The last hand of the level, I raised AK under the gun. Everyone folded to the big stacked young guy in the BB, who called. The flop was 973 and he checked. I made a bet, he raised, and I folded. Since everyone had left the table, he decided to show me he’d flopped a set of sevens.

If I ever had a hand like an overpair in that spot, I would always check back the flop - to avoid busting on the bubble if he did outflop me, and to let him bluff off some chips thinking I had overs.

The bubble was not a pleasant experience. My stack was such that folding every hand would ensure a spot in the money, but also a pretty short stack once there. There wasn’t a whole lot to be done other than sitting back and waiting for it to be over. I did manage to steal one pot raising the 54s in early position but also lost an open on the literal bubble with a random ace when Zaki reraised me. This was basically a pure bubble hand where (once the guy to my right folded UTG) I knew that no one would mess with me EXCEPT for Zaki, who would be smart to reraise me with ATC, so the question was, would he? I thought that he might fold rags so I gave it a shot, and he did show an ace after I showed an ace and folded. That hand inspired some discussion about what hands I should be shoving with after that raise, and what hands he should be calling with – I eventually decided I should be shoving only pocket aces, which means he should only be calling the shove with aces – though you couldn’t fault him for calling with kings.

Right on the bubble the short-stacked but active guy to my left raised UTG and then to everyone’s shock the young and even shorter-stacked player to his left went all-in and then even more shockingly the first guy quickly called. They both turned over pocket kings, then had to wait two minutes for the cameras to come over. Sure enough, the covering stack flopped a backdoor flush draw, but the turn ended the suspense. Personally I thought the first guy should have folded pocket kings since I didn’t see the other guy shoving with worse than kings.

When the bubble finally ended I was down to 112k. Arrangements had been made for shots for the table, which everyone gratefully took once we hit the cash. In the maelstrom that followed, I folded most hands but picked up pocket kings in back to back hands: shoving the first over Zaki’s EP open from the SB (folds), and shoving the second over Zaki’s UTG raise and a call from an older guy in LP. This time the older guy (who had been very active) considered for a minute before laying down.

Shortly after dinner Zaki raised early to something like 14k and the same older guy called. Déjà vu struck as I found pocket kings once again in the small blind and shoved in for 100k more. Zaki folded but the older guy muttered that he was “so tired of it” and called with queen-ten suited! Nothing scary hit the board and I doubled back to 240k.

Less than an orbit later I raised ATs to 14k in early position. The vampiric Max Heinzelmann, who had recently shown up with over a million chips, called from late position. The older guy who had just doubled me up with the QTs called from the BB, but not before some hesitation which hinted that he didn’t have much. The flop came ten-high with two babies and the older guy led for something like 16k. I made it 45k pretty sure I was calling a shove, Heinzelmann folded, and the older guy called. The turn was a 9 and we both checked. The river card was something low and the older guy checked. I fired something like 78k and got looked up by “a worse kicker.” I felt like the really close decision on this hand was whether or not to bet the turn to set up an all-in river bet. There is some chance the ace-ten is no good (especially with the 9 coming on the turn). Checking the turn back ensures I won’t go broke on the hand and also increases the chances I get one more good street of value in. But I really didn’t think I was beat because of the preflop tell, and also thought this guy was tilting and might feel like doubling me up again. All things considered I think I should have bet like 64k on the turn and shoved the river if called again.

The very next hand I raised AK UTG with the guy to my left along with Heinzelmann calling. The kid on the button decided this was a good squeeze spot for some strange reason and did so, but small. I made sure the kid didn’t have me covered and then jammed, and everyone quickly folded. God that is so annoying when you flat a raise with something speculative and then some dumbass behind you ruins the party with an idiotic squeeze that obviously gets shoved on.

Just like that I was up to 430k and the Oasis song “Lyla” which I’ve been listening to at the WSOP since 2005 was going off in my head – “I waited for a thousand years for you to come and blow me out my mind…” My hands were shaking as I stacked the chips.

The old guy who had been my lifeline tilted off the rest of his stack and was replaced by another older guy named Thomas Grey who looked pretty straightforward. He raised a hand from early position and I called a couple behind him with AK. I think Heinzelmann or someone may have called as well. The flop came AK9 rainbow. For the second time and the first since day one I had flopped more than one pair. Grey led out for 20k and I felt like he had a piece. I raised it up to 52k which prompted a fold from the third party and a quick call from Grey. I felt like he probably had AQ or AJ and was looking forward to adding another wing to my growing castle of chips. The turn came a six and I bet 68k after Grey checked. He then raised to 200k and I threw up in my mouth. Suddenly it didn’t feel as much like AQ or AJ. He had another 100k behind which I moved in after a short tank and he called with a matching AK.

Another hand involving Grey came with Andrew Brokos raising early and Grey calling in late position, then calling down three big barrels on a Q55xx board and showing AQ after Brokos collected the pot with KK.

Grey busted my friend Joe calling a raise with Q6o big blind vs small, calling a bet on an 854 flop, then raising the 7 turn and getting it in vs Joe’s J4. I tell that story not to embarrass Joe, a skilled and manipulative player, but to provide context for the hand that ends this long story.

Incredibly my friend Chris Moore was moved in to the seat Joe vacated. Chris (Toph) and I were texting back and forth about the players when it occurred to me that Toph had about the same stack and we could swap some action. Although I generally try to swap a lot of action in the WSOP, I hadn’t asked Toph to swap before the tournament because he is such an incredible player that I believe asking him to swap is simply unfair, especially since he’s such a nice guy he might say yes. But at this point it seemed reasonable, so I asked him how many chips he had and he quickly proposed a 2% swap with more possibly at the end of the day.

I had folded about an hour’s worth of garbage and anted down to 360k when Heinzelmann raised a pot to 18k with Grey calling from the cutoff. I called with 22 from the SB and the BB folded. The door card was a deuce with offsuit 6 and 3 coming behind it. I checked, Heinzelmann checked, and Grey snap-checked. The turn was a ten, a second diamond. Again I checked, Heinzelmann now bet 35k, and Grey immediately slid in a twenty-stack of orange 5k chips making it 100k. I winced and stared at Grey (who had never given off anything physically perceptible), which is something I sometimes do when I have a strong hand but am genuinely concerned. I thought for a while and then shoved about 340k, Heinzelmann quickly folded, Grey called with a set of sixes, and I busted in 408^th place for $30,974.

When you bust the Main Event putting the money in behind, inevitably you are going to torment yourself over the fatal hand, wondering if it could have been played any better. I’ve agonized over this one and concluded that my best play on the turn, once I checked it and Grey raised Heinzelmann’s bet, was to fold the hand. My second best option was to call the 100k and see what happened on the river. It was certainly a cooler hand and I would never have been able to get away from it had someone bet the flop, but as played, it was foldable.

Grey is not going to show up with an overpair or two pair in that situation. There are two hands that I wonder about: a flush draw (possibly with a gutshot, possibly with two overs), and a ten. I do not know for certain how he would play a strong flush draw, but my guess is that he would have called. It should also be noted that he instantly raised the bet.

To this day I wonder how he would have played a ten. I truly do not know, but I think there’s around 65% chance he would have just called (the AQ hand vs Brokos suggests this as well) with most tens and maybe even ace-ten. Having done this autopsy, I think a fold was certainly in order. The hands Grey is most likely to have will always call the shove and have me drawing to one out with one to come.

That hand obviously wasn’t the way I wanted my career as a professional poker player to end, but it was a wonderful and thrilling experience to finally make a run in the Main Event – and I will be back to play it again, hopefully every year for the rest of my life.

July Top 15

15. Bon Iver - Minnesota, WI
14. Pink Floyd - Welcome to the Machine
13. Bon Iver - Perth
12. The Naked and Famous - Young Blood
11. Cake - End of the Movie

10. Red Hot Chili Peppers - Under the Bridge
9. Bon Iver - Holocene
8. Loreena McKennitt - The Mummer's Dance
7. Loreena McKennitt - Skellig
6. Wilco - You Never Know

5. Griffin House - Lonely One
4. Green Day - J.A.R.
3. Red Hot Chili Peppers - The Adventures of Rain Dance Maggie
2. Metallica - The Unforgiven III

Song of the Month: Mark Knopfler - Border Reiver

My Main Event - Day Three

Badih Bounahra, who would go on to the final table, was seated on my direct left for the duration of the day. You couldn’t ask for better. Bounahra played very few hands and, from what I could tell, never made any moves. He was a stone cold rock. Of all the players I played with during this tournament, there were at least thirty I would have deemed more likely to reach the final table. I kept reading about his double-ups on pokernews, which typically came about with players misjusdging his range and going with hands they should against random pros on the internet. If the guy folds three straight buttons, he’s probably not raising garbage on the fourth. Give him credit and fold your king-nine offsuit. I was absolutely stunned by the call which essentially set the final table, with shortish stack John Hewitt raising early and then calling Bounahra’s sizable reship with KQo. After playing a day with Bounahra, I can tell you the calling range in this scenario was pocket queens, kings, and aces. Ace-queen suited was an easy fold, with ace-king and pocket jacks right on the fence. It just goes to show you that talented players inevitably crack up during the course of the two-week journey that is the Main Event. Simply keeping your head on straight provides a substantial advantage.

I was nervous going into day three. It was the first time I’d made the third day of the Main. My table draw didn’t appear particularly favorable, with several solid but non-famous pros seated there – the type of table I have been known to underestimate in the past. And if I busted day three, I was to catch a flight the next day to Seattle to climb Mount Rainier, with serious doubts about whether I was physically, mentally, or emotionally prepared to do so.

I just wasn’t catching many playable cards the third day, just as I hadn’t throughout the first two. This kept my nose clean, gave me a lot of respect when I did enter a pot, and kept the variance low. In the first level, I busted a short stack calling his shove with pocket kings and holding against fours. That was the only hand of significance I played the first five and a half hours of the day.

The most interesting thing that was going on during the afternoon session was Andrew Rosskamm throwing out prop bets. He created a couple lines, saying he’d take either side of the action for up to $1,000. The first was the number of players left at the end of the day, and he set a line so judicious no one at the table wanted a piece. But his second line was outrageous, setting the over/under for the largest end-of-day stack at 2.7 million. I had discussed this figure previously with some friends, and we had it around 1.4 million. Bounahra beat me into the pot and I quickly followed suit for $500 apiece.

I bled down to near 100k but was able to pick off another short stack with QQ against his ATs. Not too long after that a young guy who had been moved to my right raised from the cutoff and I called with QJo on the button. It turned out this was Luke “bdbeatslayer” Vrabel. He c-bet a KTx flop, which I called. The turn paired the king and he slowly check-folded to my bet.

Not too much later I found my favorite hand, KTs, and raised from middle position. Rosskamm called from the big blind. He checked the Q75 flop so fast I felt like he hit it, and I resigned myself to a thousandth straight missed flop and small pot lost. The turn came a 9 giving me a gutty to the nutty and he fired out a medium-sized bet. I now decided he would bet any hand here and wasn’t ready to give up the pot that easily, so I called. The river was an 8. Rosskamm, who normally acted very quickly, hesitated a beat upon the river card before throwing out a bet of slightly less than half the pot. I paused just a moment confirming I could represent a six, then made a 3x raise. Rosskamm disgustedly folded a queen face up, so I showed my hand too.

Shortly after Rosskamm went ahead and paid Bounahra and I the $500, which was a classy move with half an hour left in the day. The chipleader would finish around 1.2m.

After that bluff and a successful three-bet of Vrabel I was up to 200k and felt like I had finally taken control of the table. Unfortunately after that I lost a slew of pots including

• Getting squeezed out of a hand preflop by Bounahra
• Twice getting three-bet by players I deduced were unlikely to be making moves
• Raising QTs and failing with a c-bet on a 975 flop
• Flatting Vrabel’s EP raise with AK and folding on a J87ish flop
• Doubling up a short stack with eights against nines the final hand of the night

I finished with 142k, happy with my effort but unhappy to have less chips than I began the day with.

Wise Words From The Red Hot Chili Peppers

Hey now
We've got to make it rain somehow

My Main Event - Day Two

The second hand of the day, a big stack named Jeff Becker who would ultimately finish 134^th, raised from the cutoff and I called from the big blind with 65 of diamonds. The flop came Jd9d4 and I elected to check-call. The turn was a 4d and now I bet out; Becker called. The river wasn’t really what I wanted to see, a nine, but I decided betting was better than checking and fired out what I thought to be a bet of uninterpretable size, 6350 into a pot of about 11,000. To my disgust Becker raised to 15k and though he looked like a player capable of bluffing in this spot I ultimately decided to fold. His bet size didn’t appear bluffy. I didn’t think he would launch a bluff like this against an unknown the second hand of the day, and on the turn I thought he had either a nine or a jack, the latter which probably would call my river bet or fold to it. After the table broke Becker told me had a nine with a diamond, though you never know for sure.

The new table was not what I was hoping for. Right away it was pretty clear there weren’t any real weak players, and most were obvious pros. David Fox (four to my right), Valdemar Kwaysser (two to my right) and Frank Rusnak (on my right) were the ones I recognized. It seemed like everyone at the table was riding a short to medium stack, so it looked to be a total grindfest.

And that’s exactly what it was. I bided my time, keeping things close to the vest. I watched a wild hand go down where Fox raised, Kwaysser reraised, Fox called, Fox check-called the Th7d3h flop, then check-shoved the Ad turn. I was about 75% that Kwaysser was bluffing, and 70% that Fox had a big draw based on the speed of his turn check-shove which appeared to me that he was feigning confidence looking for a fold. Kwaysser ended up calling with 86hh while Fox turned over 98dd.

I got involved on the button with the 74 of clubs, calling Kwaysser’s hijack raise after Rusnak had done likewise. The blinds folded and the three of us took a J22 rainbow flop. Kwaysser threw out a bet that looked weak to me, and Rusnak called. I wasn’t convinced Rusnak had much either, probably a pair of sevens or something. The problem was that I couldn’t represent anything. Finally I decided to call, thinking they would put me on a jack or better and check-fold the turn. The plan seemed to be working perfectly when we saw a 9 on the turn and they checked it to me, but to my surprise, Rusnak called my bet. The river was a six and I thought I was gonna shut it down, but I knew Rusnak to be a somewhat cautious (for a younger guy), thinking player. He cannot put me on a hand worse than ace-jack if I am still value betting. Though there are very few hands he can put me on worthy of a value bet, there are no hands he can put me on that would call a flop bet and continue to bet later in the hand – except for those unlikely powerhouses. I threw out a bet of 10k into roughly 14k, and Rusnak folded after a minute in the tank. I later saw something about a “big laydown” in his twitter feed.

A while later I raised with 65s in middle position and the English player two to my left called. The flop came something paired like 7-7-2 and I made a small continuation bet which was quickly called. The turn was an ace. Continuing to bet here is a common bluff, and I knew my opponent knew that. At the same time, I felt this player would credit me with a highish pair or even the ace itself if I checked, so I did so. He quickly checked behind. The river was a blank and I threw out a bet of 40% pot, which he folded to after thirty seconds. Later he announced that he held pocket nines and should have reraised me preflop.

After Kwaysser was eliminated, a loose Latin-American player filled his seat. The first time I played a pot with this fellow came when he raised in mid position and I called from the cutoff with ace-jack offsuit. The flop came KQx rainbow and he continuation-bet. This player had c-bet every time after raising and appeared relatively straightforward postflop (though I couldn’t see him making many big laydowns), so I quickly called. Stunningly the next card off was a ten, turning me the not straight for the second time in the tournament. To my delight, my opponent continued betting, 4300. I raised to 10,200 leaving myself with 21k behind. To my surprise, my opponent just called the bet without eyeing my stack. I figured he had to have a nice hand to keep betting on that turn card, and could never put me on a straight. I thought the money was going in right there, but I had left myself with a nice bet-size to shove the blank on the river with after he checked. I forced myself to count down from 100 to 0 before moving in, having decided that would look weaker than an immediate shove. My opponent thought for just a moment, and folded.

Shortly after dinner the table broke and packed up for the Amazon Room. Though I recognized two solid pros, Frank Sinopoli and Kristy Gazes, at my new table, I was pretty happy with the rest of what I saw at first glance. Right away it felt softer. The biggest stack was an older man across the table who appeared a bit fishy at first glance, as did the gentleman to my left, an older foreigner of about 50 years. Just as I walked up he was locked in a pot with Sinopoli, the former having called a raise out of the big blind. The flop was A94 with two diamonds, and he check-called Sinopoli’s bet. The turn was the Qd, and the big blind checked again. Sinopoli now turned up the heat with a substantial turn bet. The older fellow appeared uncomfortable with the bet, and was thinking about what to do for quite a while. As we waited, I stood up to fit my hoodie onto my seat. As I was doing so, the big blind rechecked his cards, and I caught sight of the ace of clubs in his hand. To my surprise, the older fellow then tossed in a raise. Sinopoli immediately started chuckling, disgusted with the “Hollywood” the older fellow had just put on. Sinopoli folded snappily, stating it was obvious the big blind had a monster and he did not appreciate the Hollywood the whole table had waited through before his raise on the turn. The BB then showed the six of diamonds, which was a pointless show for the rest of the table but one of great significance for me.

That show only reaffirmed Sinopoli’s insistences that the guy had the nuts, and he continued to reference the hand for the next several minutes. It was a hilarious dynamic – the big blind must have been cracking up inside knowing how he had duped Sinopoli. And it was even funnier for me, knowing the old man was laughing inside, laughing inside myself at the situation, all the while unable to tell anyone I was in on the joke.

My first big blind at this new table saw the old guy with the big stack open 2.4x in early position with Sinopoli calling. I looked down at the 32 of diamonds. I was tempted to jump right in with this marginal holding, but couldn’t quite justify a call with my 55 BB stack. The flop came 4s3sh2h. I would have certainly just check-shoved the pile here if I had called to see the flop. The older guy bet hard and was called by Sinopoli. On the Js turn, the older guy check-called Sinopoli’s bet. On the river, a second four, the older fellow again check-called, only to be shown A4 of clubs and mucking KsKd in disgust. There is little question I would have gone broke in this hand if I had tossed in the chips with the 3-2 before the flop.

From late position I raised KJhh and the older gentleman, the fellow who had falsely Hollywooded Sinopoli, called. The flop came 886 with two hearts and I bet 3000. The older guy made it 7500. With 40k in my stack it seemed a little overaggressive to just put the money in here so I just called. I led 12k on the 5h turn and was called, then another 22k after an offsuit trey hit the river. I had just 15k behind. The old guy appeared at times as if he was going to put me in, which made me sick to my stomach, but he eventually announced call and my hand was good.

I had just finished stacking the chips when Sinopoli raised 3x in midearly position. I wasn’t sure what to make of it but wasn’t folding KQ from the hijack. The flop came QT8 with two diamonds and a club and Sinopoli quickly checked. I checked behind but I think betting here is preferable. The turn was a ten bringing a second flush draw and he now made a fairly large bet which I called. He fired another pretty decent bet when the river bricked completely. I almost folded right away, just feeling like I was beat, but eventually convinced myself to call based on the way the hand had played out. He turned over pocket kings, and would go on to finish in 38^th place for $196k, the biggest score in a lengthy live tournament career.

The next major confrontation came when I raised 97hh from the cutoff with both blinds calling. The flop came Ah4s3h and the small blind led out for 5100 with the BB quickly folding. My normal line is to call here as the donk-bettor has a very strong hand or a very weak hand more than a medium strength hand like an ace and you can pick up the pot on the turn with minimal risk if he has the weak one, or hit the flush and win plenty off the strong one. But here I raised to 13.2k having sensed a little weakness in his bet. I also doubted if I could take him off an ace if I just called here, though a turn raise would have looked stronger (but been more committing) should he lead again.

When he raised me back another 17k I felt sick to my stomach. I was now pretty sure he had “the strong hand”, most likely a set though two pair was possible. A higher flush draw wasn’t out of the question though I figured he would have raised harder, and neither was a stone bluff though that was pretty farfetched. I had 49k left in my stack at that moment, facing the 17k bet. There was 200 x 9 = 1800 in antes in the pot + 3 x 3100 = 9300 (my preflop raise and two calls) + 13,200 x = 26,400 (my raise and his match) + 17,100 (his raise) in the pot.

1800 +

9300 +

26,400 +

17,100

= 54,600

I did the math rather hastily at the table, seeing that I was getting better than 3:1 on a call knowing he was shoving my last 32,000 on the turn regardless of the card. It would cost 17k to win the 54k in the pot, but then I would win another 32k if I hit, so roughly I’d be spending 17k to win 86k.

17,100 / 86,600 = .197 = odds I need to profitably call the bet assuming he has set and he shoves the turn regardless of what comes

Using an estimation of 8.3 outs (sometimes he will have two pair, sometimes 44 with a heart) and 45.6 cards left in the deck (we can account for the board cards, my cards, and sort of his cards)

8.3 / 45.6 = .182 = rough odds I have of hitting a heart on the turn

As you can see, I wasn’t getting the right odds to call this bet…and that’s not even including the fact (again, if he has the expected set) he has a ten out redraw to win the pot if I turn the flush.

~ 37 / 44 = .84 = odds my turned flush holds

.84 X .182 = odds I turn a flush and it holds = .153

1 / .153 = odds I need to call the bet = 6.54 to 1

86.6 / 17.1 = implied odds I’m getting = 5.06 to 1

So, assuming I calculated all this correctly (which, I must admit, I am not certain of), I wasn’t getting the odds I needed to be getting, and, if I was indeed confident he had a set, I should have folded – without even considering the extra value of tournament life, or how important the 17k would be to my stack at the time, or, on the other side of things, how useful the added chips would be. There is no exact math in these sort of situations as my opponent might have nothing and check-fold the turn, making my call far more profitable, or he might have ace-king and I might turn a pair or gutshot, etc. But this estimation makes it pretty obvious calling 17k more on the flop really just to see one more card wasn’t a wise decision.

It sure felt like a wise decision when a heart hit the turn, he shoved with 33, the river didn’t pair the board, and I doubled up to 134k.

I immediately kicked it up, getting involved in four out of the next five pots. On the fifth, I raised ace-jack from 3^rd position to 3k with the older fellow on my left calling. The big blind, who had lost a couple large pots recently, shoved all-in for 20k. The big blind was not a reckless player, but I still quickly called. The other guy got out of the way, the BB flipped over KQ, and the board came five low cards. A few people at the table expressed surprise at the call with AJ asking how I could call, but I felt it was standard.

At some point I raised 65dd under the gun with a young player calling in middle position. The flop came AKQ with two diamonds and I check-called a bet. Most players are c-betting with their flush draw here but I like check-calling as it allows him to take a bluff at it which he will surely give up on the turn if called. At the same time, he will never see the flush coming if does have a hand. The turn was a queen and we both checked; the river was a blank and he was happy to call my third-pot bet with AK.

I lost a few more small pots and ended the day with 145k.

WSOP Recap Part One: My Main Event - Day One

I’ve always felt like the Main Event was the perfect tournament for me, with its long levels, deep stacks, and fishy field. Exploiting weak players playing deepstacked poker has been the thing I’ve been best at ever since my early cash days on Party Poker in 2004. Yet the first six times I played the Main, I never came close to cashing. There has been a ton of bad luck, more so in terms of missing flops than anything else. Lifetime I estimated my setflopping percentage around 5% in the Main coming into this year, and that percentage actually decreased after going something like 1 for 25 with pocket pairs this year.

But I also think I was generally playing way too many hands in the early levels – particularly from early position – and playing them too passively. While I usually found myself at tables full of weak players, I think I went overboard with some of the preflop calls in the past in such a desperation to hit a hand and stack a fish. I probably underestimated the play of my unknown opponents and overestimated the action I would get when I finally did hit a hand.

I came in this year with resolve to tighten it up a bit (especially in early position), give some more respect to my opponents unless I had strong reason not to, and to stay patient remembering that two thirds of a starting stack at the end of day one would still be 40 BB entering day two.

The overwhelming weakness in my game is preflop. Strangely I feel pretty confident in my preflop reads in just about every pot except the ones I get involved in myself. It really has gotten pretty laughable the last few years. Seemingly every time I launch a 3-bet it gets 4-bet right back in my face. I have basically been giving away chips for the last few years on light 3-bets, and would have fared better over that time without ever having made one weak 3-bet. A little over two years ago I light 3-bet the preflop master Adam Geyer three times in half an hour in an FTOPS tournament, and he 4-bet me all three times forcing folds. After that I decided to just flat out stop reraising hands preflop, and went on to finish fourth in that tournament. Slowly I got back to reraising some hands preflop, with horrific results. So I 3-bet just four hands (not including three reshoves on day four) in four days at the WSOP Main Event:

1. 65o a few hours into day one after two guys limped and the older fellow to my right raised 3x which didn’t seem like the size he would make it with a big pair (everyone folded)
2. A7s in position on day two against a foreign player who was fairly short-stacked and would have to commit his stack (everyone folded)
3. AJo from the button to Kristy Gazes’ cutoff raise late on the second night (everyone folded)
4. A9o in middle position to Luke Vrabel’s EP raise on night three (everyone folded)

I uninvest 4-bet one hand: QQ when a fishy player raised early and Kirbynator 3-bet right behind him (everyone folded). The uninvest 4-bet bluff is a play I am actually lot more comfortable making than the 3-bet bluff (like I said, I’m pretty astute at deciphering when someone else is doing it light), but never really had a spot where I wanted to do it in this tournament. I also 4-bet zero hands after someone 3-bet me.

The strongest part of my game is knowing when to call, raise, and fold in marginal postflop situations in heads-up hands. I’ve always been a strong heads-up player, probably because it is impossible for your opponents to 3-bet you in position. I generally defend my BB much lighter than is “correct” because of playing those situations so many times heads up. So generally I try to get involved with a lot of KQo, Q9s, 97s, 44 type hands in single-raised pots in and out of position and proceed from there.

But throughout this tournament I wasn’t catching those sort of hands. I folded junk for prolonged periods of time at several different junctures in the Main Event, playing just two to four hands in a level a few different times. This gave me a lot more respect than I generally receive when I would open-raise a hand, so I wasn’t 3-bet nearly as much as I’ve become accustomed to. Throughout the tournament I would usually see a bunch of quick folds when I did raise a hand, often after I had folded 15-20 hands in a row preceding that raise.

So my general image was a tight one, though that wasn’t the case at my first table. I tried to remember every significant or notable hand I was involved with and compiled them all here on the blog like I used to back when I was a serious professional poker player. There were a ton of small hands where I called a raise with a pocket pair or suited connector en route to a multi-way pot where I had an obvious postflop fold. Those hands constantly ate away at my stack, but this year I think I was almost always right to speculate in the situations I did choose to call a raise without a strong preflop hand. At the same time I picked up the blinds uncontested on a higher percentage of my raises than I’m used to, which helped keep my stack steady when I was losing other pots.

For four days I waited to flat a raise with a big pair in hopes that someone might squeeze behind, and in four days I never had that opportunity.

Though poker stopped being my profession the moment I was knocked out of the Main Event, I have found myself with renewed interest in the game after playing the tournament for four days then watching it four more on ESPN2 and ESPN3. Any analysis or criticism is welcome.

The very first hand a 30ish guy who a week later I learned was Nate Silver opened in early position and I looked down at ace-king a couple slots behind him. I just called, just called a biggish bet on a KQx flop with a flush draw, then called another biggish bet again on a blank turn conceding that I might lose 20% of my stack on the very first hand. But he checked a blank river, I threw out a medium bet, and he folded.

A few minutes later I raised T7s in latish position and checked down the entire board when it came with a seven and (eventually) three overcards to beat the small blind’s ace-king. The small blind was a young Asian player who looked like Napoleon Ta, so it was a little surprising he had just called with AK preflop. With my T7 being shown down after his AK, I thought there was a good chance this kid would be reraising me in the future with some garbage hands knowing I was opening light while expecting me to give him credit for a hand since he didn’t reraise the AK. Sure enough, the next time I raised in late position (with 43s) and the button called the kid came over the top in the big blind. Despite the fact that I was expecting him to do this with almost anything I ended up just calling the reraise in position, instead of four-betting, showing the three of clubs after his fold, and asserting control of the table. Despite the lack of confidence I have in my preflop game this was pretty much a mandatory four-bet spot with my hand and the confident read I had that this kid would be 3-betting with anything, and I’m still disappointed I didn’t pull the trigger on that one. The flop came KT7 and I slowly folded to the kid’s c-bet when again, I should have raised his ass.

The very next hand I raised with AQss and the kid three bet out of the small blind. This time I thought he was strong, but was still happy to call a three-bet in position with my hand. The flop came 552 with two spades. I called his bet, checked the turn back when he checked, and folded to his river bet when two other low cards hit the board.

Sometime not too much later I had either opened or called a raise with 76s and the kid squeezed again from the blinds, and again I had called his reraise in position. The kid tried to get fancy on a KTx9J board with his K9s checking it the whole way but I never took the bait and he was forced to turn over the hand which he won nothing with postflop. I was hopeful turning that hand over would slow down his squeezing and 3-bets and surprisingly (along with losing a large pot) he did slow down.

I limped tens under the gun for 100 and the button who was obviously an amateur made it 200. I couldn’t tell if he knew I limped (which happens a ton when I limp UTG). One of the blinds called as did I. The flop was 987 and we checked to the button who bet 500. The blind folded and I called. The turn was an 8, I checked, and the button now bet 1000. I called again. The river was a 9, I checked, and the button now bet 3000. I didn’t think this guy would launch a triple-barrel bluff but on the other hand it didn’t make sense for him to have many hands so I eventually called and was good against his 63s.

That same guy played a headscratching hand a bit later where he called an EP raise, checked an 864 flop over to the button (Silver), called Silver’s bet after the preflop raiser folded, check-called another bet on a 7 turn, and, incredibly, was unable to beat Silver’s A4 after the board paired and the river was checked down. So when he raised in early position I knew I would be calling with anything remotely playable, did so with 64o, and was happy to take the flop heads up. I raised his c-bet on the A53 flop hoping to win the hand right there, buy myself a river card, and build a bigger pot to bet into when I hit my straight. He quickly called the raise basically letting me know he had an ace, and I shut it down after the turn and river whiffed and he checked to me. He won with A7s.

The hand that got me going came when I raised KQ to 525 with the young Asian calling from the SB and an older fishier player calling from the big. The flop came T98 and I thanked them for the free card and checked behind when checked to. The turn was an orgasmic jack. The small blind checked and the older guy bet 1000. I didn’t see this guy laying a queen so I went for the jugular and raised it to 4500. He called after a short think. I overbet the river for 12k and got looked up by QJ, the flopped nuts.

PiMaster was watching the hand with his sister from the rail and was able to explain to her exactly what was going on the entire time. It was a pretty cool low-level tutorial poker hand which clearly juxtaposed the hand-reading ability of the pro compared to the fish. I’m sure seven of the ten players at the table knew precisely what I had but it didn’t matter because one of the ones who didn’t know for sure was the one I was playing against.

I was so happy and excited after this hand. For six years I have seen these transparent hands play out in the Main Event without ever being the beneficiary of one. Finally it happened for me and now I had the stack to splash around at this weak table for the rest of the day.

Not too long after that the weak player limped for 300 along with Silver and I made it 1400 with AQcc with only Silver calling. The flop came AsJs8c and I checked it back. The turn was a four and he fired 2300. I called. The river was a blank, he fired 5200, and I called and lost to his set of fours. I had to compose myself after this hand, telling myself that I played it the way I did for a reason (Silver was blufftastic) and that it had simply been unlucky and that folding the river would have been silly in that situation.

Silver, who was probably the most active player at the table, raised a hand under the gun and I called with AK again. The flop was Axx and he bet. I felt like this was a really close spot between calling and letting him bluff off some more (I had shown I would call A high flops in these spots with hands like 99 earlier) or raise (I had raised the fish in this exact same situation with unshown cards in the 64o hand). With that hand fresh in people’s memory I decided to raise here and Silver folded.

Not too long after that the exact same situation came up with the weak player and Silver limping and me raising to 1400 with K8ss. This time a woman I had played with for an afternoon at the Venetian called behind me and then both limpers called. The flop came 874 and I checked to keep things under control and make it appear as if I had nothing when the limpers checked to me. The woman checked behind. The turn was a 3 bringing a flush draw. When Silver bet I rechecked my whole cards feigning two overs with a flush draw then called. The others got out of the way. The river was an offsuit king and I had an easy value bet when he checked, and got paid off almost immediately. 47k. The real question in this hand was whether I was value-betting on the end, and I probably would if he checked to me on a 2, 3, 4, queen, and possibly jack.

To my disgust I got moved from this table two minutes before the dinner break. I felt like I was about ready to go on a rampage here with a lot of three-betting the weaker, looser players on my right even though that’s not my game. With the antes coming in, the way they were playing, and my image, I was excited to really start playing some poker but instead I was moved to a much tougher table with several younger pros including my close friend Paul Wasicka, Canadian pro InescapableD, and Kirbynator. Paul didn’t have a big stack but those other two did and were playing quite well to boot. With four hours left in the day I basically decided to play pretty tight and hope for a better table draw on day two.

That was exactly what happened. I raised KJo in middle position after folding about thirty hands in a row. The big blind defended. I had said in my twitter that I never flopped better than one pair until the fourth day of the tournament but forgot this one came KQJ all diamonds. The BB led out which felt like some sort of real hand from that player so I elected to just call. I really didn’t know where I was at and folding even crossed my mind cause I picked up a tell of strength when the flop hit. At the same time I thought he would check a flopped flush to me so I was thinking straight, two pair, or Adx. The turn was a low diamond and he checked. I checked it back but I think the better play would have been to bet with the intention to put him in on the river regardless of what came. His stack size combined with my read made this a little better I think, though this player did seem like he might be ready to call off his stack light after steadily siphoning off his chips over the last hour. The river was another diamond, he checked again, I checked, and he won with 64dd flopped flush.

The next notable hand came when Inescapable raised UTG and I flatted with AK in late position. We took a flop of KQ9 with a flush draw heads up and he bet 1300. I made it 3200 as an info/value raise and he called. I didn’t want to be put in a calldown guessing game by this tough player so decided to raise the flop knowing he really couldn’t raise me back with anything but the nuts. The turn was a blank and I checked after he did. The river was another blank and he thought about betting, but then checked. I thought I was good so pretended to have missed a flush draw (which is the only hand that really makes any sense for me to have) and bet 7050. He quickly called with a set of queens, which was a shockingly strong hand for him to have considering the action. He actually got max value on this hand because of what I had, but I think a river checkraise was in order as me having a jack-ten is extremely unlikely having checked back the turn. In retrospect I’m not a huge fan of my river bet, as there are more hands he’ll have that beat me than inferior ones that might call my bet.

Shortly after that a fairly tight and solid player raised early to 1025 and I just called with AK right behind him. He bet 1200 on a ragged flop and I decided to peel in position though I didn’t love the situation. The turn was a king and he now bet just 1400. I wasn’t quite sure what was going on so I just called again. The river was another blank with minimal straight and flush possibilities and he bet 1600. I raised to 6600ish and he called after a minute or two. I’ve found people pay off these sort of spots more often than not suspicious that they just got raised because they made such an obviously weak bet. I finished day one with 45k feeling pretty decent about the water I had just tread over the last four hours without many hands at that tougher table.

Toph and the Unsolvable Hand

Congrats to Toph Moore on his 21st place finish in the Main Event for $302k, though I know he was bitterly disappointed at falling short of the November Nine. Toph lost a 20 million chip pot near the end of the seventh night that I have been chewing on for the last 24 hours, unable to come up with a solution.

The hand was reported incorrectly on pokernews. The action was essentially this: At 80-160k blinds, Anton Makiievskiy, a strong young Ukrainian player, raised early and Toph called in position with the AJ of hearts. Toph had Anton outchipped roughly 12m to 10m. The flop came out KJJ rainbow. Anton fired a standardish continuation bet of 450k on the flop and Toph raised to 1.1 million. Anton then made it 2 million to go, and Toph clicked it back to 2.9 or 3 million. This all took a while going back and forth with both players carefully considering, but then Anton quickly moved all-in for about 9.2 million, and Toph quickly called. Anton had KJ and the board ran out blanks.

I believe Toph was aware that Anton had bet an 863 flop with J4o after raising preflop, got checkraised by Bryan Devonshire, and then reraised with nothing and took the pot down. I don't think he had much other information about his opponent.

I have thought about this hand over and over and have yet to decide on the appropriate line. I'm sure it will be a hand discussed for years to come in the poker community. It seems like Toph's hand should be played fast and hard for maximum value, but it also seems like he may have overplayed it to get all the chips in to that action. I've considered a ton of different lines for this hand but none feel right.